Task 0x7f1dc5be… · Newton Explorer

SENDER

0xf39fd6e5…ffb92266

POLICY CLIENT

0x3099d6ed…8d67071c

POLICY SET

0x4db6edaa…4313 · rev 0

POLICIES

0 · 0 with WASM

CHAIN

Ethereum · 1

EVALUATION

NON-COMPLIANT

QUORUM

— of stake · threshold 0%

CREATED

2025-10-06 18:54:35 UTC

PROOF STATE

Pending

ATTESTATION EXPIRES

Block —

CHALLENGE WINDOW

Closes block — · 30 blocks

CHALLENGEABLEOpen for challenge until block —.

Anyone may re-evaluate this policy and submit a zero-knowledge proof that the result is wrong — challenge submission is permissionless. A successful challenge voids the attestation and slashes every operator that signed it.

01 — CHAIN OF CUSTODY

18:54:35Z UTCSubmittedOff-chain ingestion timestamp, carried on chain in the taskTask0x7f1dc5be883483d9ed21afeb5e432e8cae766929102909a45da31aba102e13b9Block23520644

02 — INTENT

No ABI available for selector 0x62757928616464726573732c75696e743235362c75696e74333229 — switch to RAW to inspect the calldata.

03 — ATTESTATION · BLS AGGREGATE (alt_bn128)

attestation— — not yet responded

04 — OPERATOR SET · WHO SIGNED

of operators · — of stake · threshold 0%

Operator	BLS pubkey (G1)	Stake weight	In aggregate

One aggregate BLS signature is submitted on chain, not one per operator — so an individual signature, the prepare/commit phase it was produced in, and per-operator latency are not recoverable from any record. Membership above is exact; the parts the gateway discarded after aggregating are not shown rather than guessed.

05 — TEE · NOT APPLICABLE

No policy in this set reads private data, so its operators produced no enclave attestation and none is stored on chain. Privacy is decided per policy — a set needs only one slot touching a privacy namespace, and then the whole set runs inside one enclave request. Correctness here rests on the policy re-evaluation proof any challenger can generate — section 07 — not on hardware isolation.

06 — POLICIES · FROZEN AT CREATION

Slot	Policy	WASM output	expireAfter

Which policy denied is not recorded. TaskResponse carries a single bool allowed for the whole set — every policy above was evaluated, and one denial was enough — and no per-policy result. Re-running newt_simulatePolicy against this client returns a per-policy breakdown, but that is a simulation of the set as configured now, not a record of this task.

Each slot links to the policy whose module ran in it. The bytes are from TaskResponse.rego[i], not from the policy’s current CID — every one hashes to that policy’s immutable policyCodeHash, which the chain checks before accepting a response.

07 — VERIFY INDEPENDENTLY

newton-cli policy-client status --registry 0x9445404e83ef6349cd11fa7645b2dcb7629a940f --client 0x3099d6eD5eECC1835Edc42F9362FbC958d67071C

The aggregate signature verifies against the operator set registered at block —. Anyone may re-run this check — and challenge submission is permissionless, so anyone who finds a mismatch can act on it directly.

SEAL

Issued —
Receipt hash

Transfer blocked